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Abstract 
The 2009 gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia 
has led to a severe drop in Russian gas supplies to 
some EU member states. The dispute has once again 
shown that the status quo is defective and 
unsustainable as a policy. This Policy Brief argues 
that – beyond ad hoc temporary measures, such as 
the monitoring by EU experts agreed on January 12
th 
and the 2009-10 price agreement apparently reached 
on January 18
th – the problem needs a 
comprehensive and robust solution. This would be a 
gas transit consortium, bringing all major 
stakeholders – Gazprom, Naftohaz, one or a few 
European energy companies, and the international 
financial institutions – to jointly manage the trans-
Ukrainian trunk pipeline. The consortium agreement 
would be underwritten politically and legally by a 
tripartite treaty to be ratified by the EU, Russia and 
Ukraine. The consortium should be bound by 
European standards of transparency, corporate 
governance and accounting in order to tackle the 
major problem – the lack of trust – in the EU-
Ukraine-Russia energy triangle. 
1.  The New Year’s debacle 
As if the global financial and economic crises were 
not enough. The politicians and gas men of Russia 
and Ukraine have not only grossly mismanaged their 
bilateral gas transactions, but also, as collateral 
damage, cut gas supplies to many EU countries in 
the midst of the winter’s severest freeze. South-East 
Europe has been hardest hit, Bulgaria most of all, 
with reduced city heating. Industrial users of gas 
have closed down in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Bosnia and 
Croatia.
1 Supplies into Austria stopped completely, 
                                                      
1 “Christmas lights go out as chill spreads across south-
east Europe”, Financial Times, 8 January 2009. 
and the country is now surviving on reserves. If the 
stoppage were to continue and reserves run down, 
there would be major disruption of both domestic 
heating and industrial production at the heart of the 
European Union.   
Russia and Ukraine are swapping accusations of 
blame. Neither side seems to be fully sincere or 
reasonable. Russia accuses Ukraine of not paying its 
debts and stealing gas intended for Europe, and 
therefore stopped all supplies to Ukraine on 1 
January 2009. Ukraine denies the theft and accuses 
Gazprom of trying to exact excessive prices and/or 
of refusing a parallel rise in transit fees. Russia 
insists that Ukraine repay its gas debt of $2.4 billion 
(of which all but $614 million was paid as of 1 
January 2009), while at the same time tolerating 
Transnistria’s comparably large debt.
2 As regards the 
gas price, Gazprom made references to European gas 
import prices, saying that under the system of 
indexation on oil prices (time lagged by 6 to 9 
months), Germany could currently be paying around 
$500 per thousand cubic metres (tcm). But with the 
recent collapse of the oil price, the gas price is 
expected to fall to around $250-300/tcm for 
Germany in 2009, from which for Ukraine there is a 
‘netback’ factor to be deducted for its lesser transport 
costs. But in any case the precise indexation formula 
                                                      
2 Transnistria is a secessionist state and formally part of 
the Republic of Moldova. Its gas debt to Gazprom, 
according to different estimates, ranges from $1.5 billion 
to $1.8 billion. 2 | Gnedina & Emerson 
for imports into the EU is kept secret. There is surely 
now a public policy case for these price contracts to 
be made public. Similarly, Ukraine contests the 
current price of $1.7/tcm per 100km for the transit of 
Russian gas, with President Yushchenko wishing to 
raise the price substantially.
3 
Ukraine’s gas transit system (GTS) – yearly 
transporting around 120 billion cubic metres or 80% 
of Russia’s gas to Europe – is at the centre of the 
problem. It is managed by Ukrtransgas, a subsidiary 
of a state energy company, Naftohaz. Due to 
defective economic governance, Naftohaz is 
constantly close to bankruptcy and indebted to 
Gazprom, while the GTS is in a deplorable state of 
technical depreciation. These problems are 
exacerbated by Ukraine’s highly volatile relations 
with Russia, which has not been ready to subsidise 
its gas supplies to Ukraine without political and 
economic concessions on Ukraine’s part. 
Surprisingly, despite recurrent crises, reputational 
damage and the evident dysfunctionality of the 
Ukraine-Russia energy relationship, there has been 
little attempt on either side to reach a pragmatic 
solution that would once and for all free the gas trade 
of political tensions and mischievous trade practices. 
Given this situation, it is the right time for the EU – 
badly affected by this crisis – to make the case for its 
intervention.  
The EU agreed with Russia and Ukraine on January 
12
th on the deployment of monitors, whose role it is 
to provide oversight on the ground and reassurance 
against gas theft (see Appendix 1). But this did not 
lead to the expected resumption of supplies 
immediately. As the supply blockage remained in the 
week that followed, various technical solutions were 
discussed, including recourse to gas swaps (between 
Russia, Ukraine and Bulgaria) and a temporary 
‘consortium’
4 of European gas producers who would 
fund the re-filling of the Ukrainian gas pipeline (see 
Appendix 2). Only on January 18
th, after a high-level 
meeting in the Kremlin between Russia, Ukraine, the 
EU and some other South-East European countries, 
was a price agreement reached between Putin and 
Timoshenko for 2009 and 2010. The 2009 price is to 
be the prevailing European price less a 20% discount 
with no change to the transit fee, and the 2010 price 
at the full European price (available details are given 
in Appendix 3, but so far these references to the 
‘European price’ give no indication of what the 
                                                      
3 “President otkopal trubu voiny” (“President has dug out 
the pipe” – our translation), Kommersant-Ukraina, 14 
January 2009. 
4 This temporary financing ‘consortium’ should not be 
confused with the long-term pipeline concession 
consortium that is principally advocated in this paper. 
Ukrainian ‘netback’ factor might be). The price 
agreement is due to lead to the signature of 
supporting documents on January 19
th and thence the 
resumption of supplies to Europe shortly afterwards.  
These mechanisms and agreements, however, can be 
regarded as ad hoc temporary measures that are not 
going to address the major problem, which is that of 
the alleged gross corruption and in any case the lack 
of transparency and goodwill in the gas trade 
between the Ukraine and Russia. All major 
stakeholders have no other option but to look for a 
genuine and comprehensive solution until alternative 
options become available. 
2. Alternatives 
In recent years the Nord Stream pipeline project that 
would run through the Baltic Sea from Russia to 
Germany has been presented by Russia as the best 
alternative to Ukraine’s GTS. This opinion has not 
been fully shared in the EU. On 13 November 2008, 
Putin – visibly irritated – made his ‘take it or leave 
it’ offer to the EU. “Europe has to decide: if they 
need [Nord Stream] or not. If not, we will renounce 
the project, build LNG facilities and sell gas to other 
markets”, he stated at a press conference with the 
Finnish Prime Minister.
5 Reportedly, this was the 
first time Putin admitted that negotiations on the 
Nord Stream pipeline were running into serious 
difficulties. 
There might be several reasons for this revelation. 
Russia might not be able to ensure the money or 
resources to implement this project. The politicking 
– that of avoiding ‘insecure’ transit countries – could 
have to give way to simple economic arithmetic. The 
transit pipeline on the Baltic Sea bed, with a capacity 
of 55 billion cubic meters of gas per year, would cost 
$11.5 billion to build (some estimates are even 
higher). This will be hard to obtain. The gas price 
will fall drastically in 2009, following the price of 
oil, and leave Gazprom cash-strapped and further 
indebted. The exploration of the Shtockman gas field 
– where the gas is supposed to come from starting in 
2013 – is expected to be riddled with financial 
difficulties and harsh weather conditions.
6 The Nord 
Stream could be developed only with huge 
borrowings from western banks, while for the 
Shtockman field the exploration company will need 
both tax breaks and the expertise of foreign 
                                                      
5 “Vladimir Putin ne prozeval tretii srok” (“President 
Putin has not missed the third term”), Kommersant, 13 
November 2008 (http://www.kommersant.ru/ 
doc.aspx?DocsID=1056718). 
6 “Shtokman bez nalogov” (”Shtockman without taxes”), 
Vedomosti, 10 December 2008 (http://www.vedomosti.ru/ 
newspaper/article.shtml?2008/12/10/173051). The Case for a Gas Transit Consortium in Ukraine | 3 
companies. The current financial crisis and Russia’s 
protectionist policies in the energy sector make both 
of these conditions uncertain. 
Political controversies around the Nord Stream only 
increase its cost. Putin’s irritation might have been 
caused by the scepticism of some EU member states 
with regard to the project. While Gazprom hired 
former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder as a chairman 
of the Nord Stream board and secured the support of 
Germany, and former Finnish Prime Minister Paavo 
Lipponen as a consultant the project has had a rough 
ride in the Baltic states and Sweden, through whose 
economic zones it will have to run. Gazprom has to 
consider their environmental concerns. It has also 
had to withstand certain Polish commentators 
comparing it to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and to 
address fears about Gazprom using the pipeline for 
espionage purposes. Instead of alleviating these 
fears, Putin – seemingly carried away by his ‘great 
power’ rhetoric – let slip another ‘warning’ to 
Europe. 
The EU – slowly trying to diversify its energy 
sources away from excessive dependence on Russia 
– did not fare better. Its current energy policy 
highlights its past short-sightedness. It started to 
seriously consider diversifying its gas suppliers away 
from Russia only after the Russian-Ukrainian gas 
dispute in 2006. In 2003 Russia was already 
negotiating profitable contracts in Central Asia, 
which did not contain tiresome human rights clauses. 
When the EU started venturing into Central Asia in 
2006,
7 it found itself unable to secure enough gas for 
its diversification projects, such as Nabucco or a 
Trans-Caspian pipeline. This has put Nabucco at a 
disadvantage compared to the South Stream project 
that would cross the Black Sea, and which was more 
aggressively pursued by Russia. When questioned 
about Nabucco, Putin said that he could not care less 
about the EU “digging up soil and burying its 
pipelines”.
8 However, the Nabucco project, several 
times declared dead, seems now to attract more 
interest than ever. 
As Russia and the EU look towards diversification 
projects, in the midst of a severe gas crisis there 
needs to be an urgent solution to the Russia-Ukraine 
imbroglio before trust among these main players 
thins out completely. Developing cooperation on the 
Ukraine’s GTS is essential. It would also be the most 
                                                      
7 V. Socor, “Central Asia-Europe energy projects: 
Itemizing what went wrong”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 4 
(106) 2007 (available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/ 
?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32777). 
8 “Russia, Hungary sign South Stream pipeline deal”, 
International Herald Tribune, 28 February 2008 
(http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/28/europe/EU-
GEN-Russia-Hungary-Pipeline.php). 
economically feasible way to increase energy 
security in Europe and to reverse the atmosphere of 
mutual distrust that pervades the EU-Ukraine-Russia 
triangle.  
3.  The problems of the status quo 
Even during the Cold War – despite ideological 
differences – the USSR delivered gas to Austria and 
Germany through the Ukrainian pipeline system. 
However, in the winter of 2006 Russia cut off the 
gas supplies to Ukraine due to their disagreement 
over gas prices. This dispute for the first time had a 
European dimension, as Ukraine withdrew some gas 
from the transit pipeline, destined to Gazprom’s 
European customers, without Gazprom 
compensating the missing amount. 
The 2006 gas dispute increased the mistrust of many 
EU member states towards Russia and made the EU 
rethink its reliance on Russian gas. Since then 
Gazprom has been sending its officials over to 
Brussels in the hope of repairing its damaged 
reputation in the EU and national capitals. 
Meanwhile Ukraine – perceived as a victim of 
economic aggression – won support from the EU in 
the form of ‘enhanced’ cooperation and financial 
assistance. In December 2005 Ukraine signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding on energy with the 
EU, highlighting the convergence of EU and 
Ukrainian energy interests. In 2007 and 2008 
Ukraine received a total of €157 million from the EU 
for its energy reform.
9 In November 2008 it started 
negotiations on joining the Energy Community 
Treaty. In March 2009, the EU plans an investment 
conference, to be chaired by the Czech Presidency, 
to raise funds for the rehabilitation of Ukraine’s 
pipelines.  
The current crisis shows that the status quo is not 
sustainable, as Ukraine and Russia only swept the 
existing problems under the carpet without solving 
them. Several lessons stand out for the EU here. 
First, Ukrainian elites cannot be simply acquitted of 
their own wrongdoings such as rent-seeking and 
corruption. Cooperation between the EU and 
Ukraine cannot advance without Ukraine reforming 
its energy sector. Second, the EU cannot have any 
meaningful cooperation on gas with Ukraine, 
without Russia being part of a transparent dispute-
settlement mechanism and a wider cooperation 
framework. The energy early-warning mechanism, 
launched during the 2007 EU-Russia summit in 
Portugal, and an invitation to the EU monitors to 
                                                      
9 2008 Joint EU-Ukraine report on energy cooperation 
(available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/ 
bilateral_cooperation/doc/ukraine/2008_08_29_progress_ 
report.pdf). 4 | Gnedina & Emerson 
deploy the Ukrainian-Russian border during the 
ongoing crisis are just the first steps. Finally, the EU 
has been keen on establishing a rule-based order and 
a sort of energy security architecture for all parties, 
as reflected in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). But 
this is only possible when all parties are able to agree 
on the rationale of the EU-proposed order, which is 
not the case now: hence Russia’s failure to ratify the 
ECT. The EU has had to concentrate on small-scale 
and issue-based cooperation projects, which might 
perhaps lead to a more comprehensive partnership. 
The current problematic state of the EU-Ukraine-
Russia energy relations is characterised by a lack of 
trust, a state of insecurity caused by a high degree of 
interdependence and an excessive politicisation of 
the energy trade. The 2006 and 2009 Ukraine-Russia 
gas disputes highlight how commercial disputes can 
spin out of control into major political crises. The 
crises have led to a proliferation of diversification 
projects, some of which at least have a shaky 
economic rationale. They turn an economic policy 
issue into a subject of fierce political competition 
and a battle for power. As a result, in recent years the 
EU, Ukraine and Russia have become even less 
trusting of each other as partners. 
Moreover, a number of more precise problems need 
urgent solution.  
Lack of rehabilitation of GTS and corruption in 
Ukraine. Due to mismanagement and a lack of 
investment, the GTS is in a poor condition. Built in 
the period from 1950 to 1970, already in 2004 22% 
of the Ukrainian pipelines exceeded their originally 
planned life span of 33 years, and 66% were between 
10 and 33 years old.
10 This increases the risk of 
technical break-downs and jeopardises the Russian 
gas (80%) that is exported to the EU. In 2007 a 
Commission study estimated that around €2.5 billion 
would be needed to rehabilitate Ukraine’s GTS.
11 
The lack of capital investments is due to the financial 
difficulties of Naftohaz Ukrainy, which has been and 
remains heavily indebted to Gazprom and risks 
bankruptcy. Citing the strategic importance of 
Naftohaz, the government of Ukraine has time and 
again bailed out the defaulting company.
12 
Naftohaz is also the expression of a much bigger 
problem: the Ukrainian energy sector is run by non-
                                                      
10 S. Pirani, Ukraine’s Gas Sector (2007), Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies, p. 81. 
11 2007 Joint EU-Ukraine report on energy cooperation, p. 
3 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/ 
bilateral_cooperation/doc/ukraine/2007_09_14_progress_ 
report.pdf). 
12 In 2008 Naftohaz was bailed out twice. In early 
October, the government’s bailout was of a total value of 
$1.7 billion. 
transparent gas traders under the connivance of 
corrupt elites. As a result of the 2006 crisis a non-
transparent gas agreement was concluded between 
Russia and Ukraine. It was agreed that a mix of 
cheaper Turkmen and more expensive Russian gas 
would be delivered to Ukraine by an intermediary 
company, RosUkrEnergo, owned 50% by Gazprom 
and 50% by Ukrainian businessmen (notably Mr 
Dmitri Firtash who alone holds a 45% share), and 
which has been able to receive a huge rent from its 
intermediary role.
13 RosUkrEnergo also traded gas 
profitably with chemical, steel and machine-building 
industries in Ukraine, and according to Firtash, now 
controls of 75% of Ukraine’s domestic gas market.
14 
In the meantime Naftohaz supplies gas to cash-
strapped private households and municipal 
authorities, most often at a loss. As a result, by 
December 2008, oblhazy (regional distributors of 
gas) had accumulated huge debts to Naftohaz, while 
in its turn Naftohaz had accumulated a debt of $2.4 
billion to Gazprom. The non-payment of the gas debt 
by Naftohaz and the lack of a gas supply agreement 
between Ukraine and Russia for 2009 resulted in 
Gazprom cutting off its gas supplies entirely into 
Ukraine on 1 January 2009, including supplies that 
should have gone to Europe. 
Lack of security of supplies. Due to the precarious 
state of Ukraine’s energy sector and the high 
volatility of Russian-Ukrainian relations, both the 
EU and Russia have concerns over the security of 
transit of gas through Ukrainian territory. The 2006 
and 2009 gas disputes are alarming for those EU 
member states that are most highly dependent on 
Russian gas (e.g. Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
Bulgaria and Slovakia). See the map on the 
following page. The conflicts demonstrate that not 
only technical faults but also political tensions can 
adversely affect EU energy security. Importantly, the 
lack of transparency, an adequate alert mechanism 
and proper infrastructure (such as meter stations) 
means that the EU has not been able to closely 
monitor Ukrainian-Russian energy trade. As a result 
of the new cut in supplies in January 2009, it has 
been agreed that a team of EU, Russian and 
Ukrainian monitors would be deployed to check the 
supply system at the Russian and Ukrainian frontiers. 
But, as already mentioned, this positive move has not 
yet seen resumption of supplies, and in any case is 
no more than a stop-gap measure.  
 
                                                      
13 According to its audit reports, RosUkrEnergo earned 
$795 million in 2007 and $785 million in 2006. See 
http://www.rosukrenergo.ch. 
14 “RUE kontroliruet 75% prodazh gaza na Ukraine” 
(“RUE controls 75% of gas trade in Ukraine”), Vedomosti, 
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Gas pipelines, actual and proposed, and the countries affected by the January 2009 Russia-Ukraine crisis 
 
Source: BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7830517.stm). 
 
Non-ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
by Russia. Russia has refused to ratify the Energy 
Charter Treaty, signed in 1994. In addition the 
complementary draft Transit Protocol could not be 
agreed. The ECT and the Transit Protocol would 
have established legally binding rules for 
international energy trade and transport, based on 
liberalisation, non-discrimination and competition. 
The lack of ratification by Russia showed that it 
wanted to retain its monopolistic position as a 
principal supplier and transit country of gas to 
Europe. Norway’s refusal to ratify the ECT only 
strengthened Russia’s position.  
Although the Russian leadership questions the value 
of the ECT and the Transit Protocol, the treaty could 
be most favourable for Russia’s energy transit 
through Ukraine. The ECT and Transit Protocol 
prohibit the diversion of gas from the transit 
infrastructure and provide a dispute settlement 
mechanism.
15 If it were ratified, Russia could resort 
to an external and impartial arbitration mechanism 
and seek compensation for damages, if Ukraine 
syphons off gas from the transit pipe or does not pay 
for gas deliveries. 
                                                      
15 See www.encharter.org. 
Financial crisis. The global financial crisis that 
unfolded in 2008 has hit Russia with a new 
dimension to the existing problems. For a few years 
now energy experts have been expressing doubts 
over Russia’s capacity to fulfil its gas exports 
commitments.
16 Due to mismanagement, low gas 
prices in Russia and expansionist investments in new 
pipelines, downstream assets in Europe and non-core 
businesses, Gazprom has been investing little in the 
exploration of new gas fields.
17 As a result it is 
expected to run into a possible gas deficit of 126 bcm 
of gas by 2010.
18 Its main strategy was to 
compensate for its own gas shortage by becoming 
the monopolistic buyer of Central Asian gas. The 
latter is essential for Russia to deliver on its 
                                                      
16 A. Riley, The Coming of the Russian Gas Deficit: 
Consequences and Solutions, CEPS Policy Brief No. 116, 
2006; International Energy Agency, Optimising Russian 
Natural Gas: Reform and Climate Policy, 2006; V. Milov, 
Coburn and Danchenko, “Russian Energy Policy 1992-
2005”,  Eurasian Geography and Economics 304, 2006, 
pp. 285-313. 
17 V. Milov and B. Nemtsov, Putin I Gazprom (in English 
'Putin and Gazprom'), Moscow, 2008 (online version in 
Russian: http://www.milov.info/cp/wp-content/uploads/ 
2008/10/broshura_gazprom_1.pdfV).  
18 Riley, op. cit., p. 1. 6 | Gnedina & Emerson 
commitments until new gas fields are operating (e.g. 
Yamal, Shtockman, Sakhalin-2 and Yuzhno-
Russkoe). It is also part of a strategic design, 
whereby Russia wants to remain the only transit 
bridge between gas-rich Central Asia and Europe. As 
the financial crisis has hit Europe and Russia, 
Gazprom has even less access to funding for new gas 
fields. It is forecast to lower the price of gas for 
European customers from $460-500 to $280 in 2009 
due to its indexation on the fall of oil prices from 
$140 to $40/barrel in the second half of 2008. As a 
result, its export revenues are expected to fall by 
31.7% or $20 billion in 2009.
19 Thus, Gazprom 
might be less able or inclined to spend large sums of 
money on expensive diversification projects. Hence, 
Putin’s vacillation on the prospects of the Nord 
Stream.  
4.  A Gas Transit Consortium in 
Ukraine 
An international gas transit consortium – bringing 
Ukraine, the EU and Russia to jointly manage the 
Ukrainian trunk gas pipeline – could in this situation 
provide a solution, addressing the energy security 
challenges of Russia as a supplier, Ukraine for its 
transit role, and the EU as consumer. It could be a 
win-win-win solution. The joint EU-Russia-Ukraine 
management of the Ukrainian GTS could become a 
stepping stone towards a more comprehensive 
arrangement on energy security in Europe, as was 
the case of France and Germany within the European 
Coal and Steel Community. 
An attempt to establish such a consortium was 
undertaken in 2002.
20 Then, after some unsuccessful 
attempts by Russia to acquire Ukraine’s pipelines in 
exchange for the settlement of Ukraine’s debts, 
Gazprom pressured President Kuchma to agree on an 
international consortium to manage the Ukrainian 
pipelines. Ruhrgas (now E.ON/Ruhrgas), a German 
energy giant and a close partner of Gazprom, joined 
the negotiations later. However, the parties never 
achieved a compromise on the structure of the 
consortium. Ukraine was afraid of Gazprom taking 
full control of the GTS, not least with the help of 
Ruhrgas. The EU, which could have provided an 
                                                      
19 “Gazprom poteriaet v Evrope $20 milliardov” 
(“Gazprom will lose $20 bln in Europe”), Kommersant, 15 
December 2008 (available at http://www.kommersant.ru/ 
doc.aspx?DocsID=1094437). 
20 A possibility to establish an international gas 
transportation consortium has been evaluated by 
Razumkov Centre, Gas Transportation Consortium, 
National Security and Defense Magazine No. 1, 2004 
(available at http://www.uceps.org/files/category_journal/ 
NSD49_eng.pdf); and World Bank, Ukraine: Challenges 
facing the gas sector, 2003. 
external guarantee against such a takeover, did not 
play any role.
21 In 2004 the parties returned to the 
status quo. Now – as bilateral energy cooperation in 
the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle has proved so 
defective – the parties need to return to the 
discussion of a robustly structured multilateral 
solution.  
What might be the structure of a fresh attempt? 
Three types of arrangement between the consortium 
and the Ukrainian state could be considered: 
o  First, the Ukrainian government could sell a 
stake in Ukraine’s GTS to a consortium. This 
would allow Ukraine to raise a large sum of 
money upfront but it would have to relinquish 
control over the pipelines indefinitely.  
o  Second, the pipeline could be subject to a 
concession granted to a consortium for a long 
period. The consortium operator would lease the 
pipeline for a fee and assume the obligation to 
manage, maintain and enhance the system. 
Ukraine would remain the owner of the pipeline 
upon the termination of the concession period.  
o  Third, under a management contract, Ukraine 
could transfer the management of the GTS to a 
consortium for a fee, but remain under obligation 
to rehabilitate the system itself. 
As Ukraine understandably considers the GTS as a 
strategic asset, it will resist the first option. 
Currently, the privatisation of the GTS is prohibited 
by a law “On Pipelines” that was almost 
unanimously voted in by the Ukrainian parliament in 
February 2007. On the other hand, a management 
contract would leave the need to finance major 
investments in the rehabilitation of the GTS with the 
Ukrainian government, which would mean enduring 
risks and uncertainties. As the middle way, a 
concession of the major pipeline trunk for a period of 
between 25 to 50 years would seem the most 
acceptable solution for all parties.  
Due to the high sensitivity of the subject, consortium 
negotiations would need to be conducted at both 
corporate and political levels.  
The European Commission might begin the process 
with a feasibility study and propose the first draft of 
the consortium agreement. The corporate 
negotiations should be conducted by Gazprom, 
Naftohaz, one or more European energy companies 
and the EBRD. The European participation might be 
selected on the basis of an open competition (in the 
past Ruhrgas, Gaz de France, ENI and Shell 
                                                      
21 For a detailed investigation of the consortium 
negotiations, see Elena Gnedina, “Ukraine’s Pipeline 
Politics”, forthcoming. The Case for a Gas Transit Consortium in Ukraine | 7 
demonstrated an interest in participating). The 
consortium would take the form of a public-private 
partnership, and could also secure substantial 
funding from the participating governments, the 
European Commission, the EBRD, EIB and the 
World Bank. The EBRD in particular is able to take 
equity share participation in such projects. The EIB 
and World Bank could supply substantial loan 
capital. The division of shareholdings between 
participants could take many different formulas in 
the detail. However from a strategic point of view it 
would seem plausible that neither the EU, Russian 
nor Ukrainian party would have a dominant position, 
for example 30% each with a remaining 10% taken 
up by the EBRD. The role of the EBRD could be 
particularly valuable, since its professional task 
would be to assure the correct corporate governance 
of the consortium; while politically it is important 
that the EBRD is itself owned and controlled not just 
by EU and Western interests, but also by the 
governments of Eastern Europe including Russia and 
Ukraine. 
The EU, Russia and Ukraine would provide the 
political guarantees. As well as an agreement 
between consortium participants there should be a 
binding treaty establishing the ground rules, signed 
and ratified by the EU, and Russian and Ukrainian 
governments. The treaty would inter alia protect the 
consortium from political instability and establish the 
highest level legal basis for its operations. In 
particular it should specify how the trunk pipeline of 
the consortium would be legally and managerially 
separate from the domestic Ukrainian gas 
distribution network. It should further guarantee the 
ground rules for the setting of transit fees, which 
would be the secure revenue base of the consortium, 
and hence a bankable basis upon which to raise 
funding for renewal and repair of the pipeline. The 
parties should not be able to sell their stakes to other 
parties of the consortium. The Ukrainian government 
has to remain the ultimate owner of the pipelines, 
while it has to share the benefits from using the GTS 
with other parties. 
There are indications that Moscow remains 
interested in the consortium idea. On 5 June 2008 in 
a speech in Germany, Medvedev said that Russia 
was “ready to consider a possibility to establish 
international consortiums, which would operate 
transit pipelines together with the companies from 
Russia, the EU and transit states”.
22 Putin has echoed 
these ideas more recently. Both Putin and Medvedev 
themselves point out that Russia is ready to organise 
relations with the EU and Ukraine on a pragmatic 
                                                      
22 Medvedev’s speech, Germany, 5 June 2008 (available 
at http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2008/06/05/ 
1923_type63374type63376type63377_202133.shtml). 
and commercial basis. There are in fact many 
examples already of Gazprom participating in gas 
distribution networks in Europe, with different 
shareholdings and public-private partnership 
arrangements (see the box below and Appendix 4). 
Gazprom’s investments in the CIS and the EU 
Gazprom already owns substantial stakes in 
European energy companies, including those having 
monopolistic rights in gas trade or transmission (see 
Appendix 4). For instance, Gazprom participates as 
shareholder in energy companies in Lithuania, 
Poland, Latvia and Hungary, together with their 
governments and European partners. In Slovakia it is 
part of the trilateral consortium with Ruhrgas and 
Gaz de France, which bought 49% of the transit 
pipeline from the Slovak government. In most cases 
Gazprom’s participation did not lead to energy 
blackmail or a hostile takeover of these companies 
and energy infrastructure by Gazprom.  
Instead, there is a clear trend on the part of major 
stakeholders not to politicise ongoing disputes and to 
resolve them as commercial matters. For instance, 
48% of shares of Europol Gaz in Poland – the 
consortium that owns the Polish part of the Yamal-
Europe pipeline – belong to Gazprom. The other 
48% of its shares are owned by the state company 
PGNiG. In January 2007 Gazprom asked PGNiG to 
lower the transit fees for Russian gas. It also 
demanded an increase in its decision-making rights 
beyond the original 1993 agreement. According to a 
report in the International Herald Tribune, 16 
January 2007, PGNiG refused. Despite poor Polish-
Russian relations, the dispute was kept low-profile, 
referred to a court and solved as a commercial 
dispute. This contrasts with the inflammatory 
rhetoric used by Poland and Russia towards each 
other in other cases, such as over Russia’s ban on 
Polish meat and the Polish veto preventing 
negotiation of a new EU agreement with Russia in 
2005.  
Ukrainian politicians also returned to the discussion 
on the consortium. In October 2006 President 
Yushchenko – after a telephone conversation with 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel – announced his 
support of the trilateral consortium, including 
Germany and Russia.
23 In February 2007 
Yanukovich, then Prime Minister, pleaded in favour 
of a 50/50 Gazprom-Naftohaz ownership of the 
Ukrainian GTS but this met resistance from the 
President and the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s 
                                                      
23 V. Socor, “Russian-Ukrainian ‘international’ gas 
transportation consortium back on the agenda”, Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, 3(190) 2006 (available at 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnew
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Parliament).
24 Yulia Tymoshenko, current Prime 
Minister, has not yet taken a position in this debate. 
She might welcome the three-party consortium idea, 
as it is generally in line with the policy of balancing 
between the EU and Russia, to which she 
increasingly adheres. Thus, the idea might become a 
successful testing ground for Ukraine’s national 
unity.  
Finally, the EU might, as already mentioned, find it 
quite possible to reach a consensus on the 
consortium idea. The current Czech Presidency has 
put energy as a priority field of cooperation with the 
EU’s eastern neighbours. The earlier draft of the 
Eastern Partnership stated that public/private 
approach “bringing together third country producers 
and transit countries with the EU (…) is necessary 
for key infrastructures that face heightened non-
commercial risks”. Although removed from the final 
draft, the argument – reminiscent of the consortium 
idea – might still resurface in the coming months. 
For the current Czech Presidency and the next 
Swedish one, the consortium project could become a 
major economic and political achievement, and serve 
as a stepping stone towards a more comprehensive 
energy agreement with Russia. 
5.  Benefits and costs 
For its success, every party needs to have a clear 
understanding of its potential benefits and costs.  
Ukraine 
Benefits. First, Ukraine will be able to raise funds to 
rehabilitate its pipelines. Second, it will have a 
guarantee that sufficient volumes will transit through 
its territory. By offering stakes to Russian and 
European companies, Ukraine will solve its current 
dilemma. If it relies on close and non-transparent 
relations with Russia, it runs the risk of slowing 
down cooperation with the EU. If it has tense 
relations with Russia, it might potentially lose a 
prominent place as a transit country for Russian gas. 
The consortium will bring all three parties to finance, 
decide and supervise the transit of gas through 
Ukrainian territory.  
Costs. In order to establish the consortium Ukraine 
will have to reform its energy sector and assure its 
transparency. Moreover, it will need to cede 
concession and management rights to a consortium 
with the EU and Russia. In both respects the 
Ukrainian leadership could meet internal opposition. 
                                                      
24 Mostovaya, “Eshche raz o deshevom syre” (adaptation 
of a Russian popular saying: “Once again about cheap 
cheese”), Zerklo Nedeli, 10 February 2007 (available at 
http://www.zn.kiev.ua/1000/1030/55839/). 
In order to achieve consensus on the domestic scene, 
the Ukrainian leadership should make it clear that the 
consortium will not be established if one party – the 
EU or Russia – is missing. There should also be a 
built-in guarantee that Ukraine’s GTS will not end 
up in the hands of Gazprom alone, for example as a 
result of a swap of assets between Gazprom and 
some of its close partners in Europe. As mentioned 
above, Gazprom has already demonstrated its 
support for a consortium project, which should serve 
to convince those in Ukraine who prefer closer 
cooperation with Russia.  
The Ukrainian leadership could also rely on the 
support of the EU in promoting reform of the energy 
sector. Both the Association Agreement and Deep 
Free Trade Area – which are currently being 
negotiated – should include provisions on the reform 
of the energy sector. The EU’s Energy Community 
Treaty – which so far brings together the EU and its 
Balkan neighbours, but which Ukraine aspires to join 
as a member – requires that the EU energy acquis is 
fully transferred into the domestic legislation of the 
candidate country. The EU should assist in this 
process by giving regulatory, financial and technical 
assistance. Russia’s cooperation in eliminating non-
transparent schemes in Ukrainian-Russian gas trade 
would also be welcome.  
Russia 
Benefits. The consortium will address a major 
problem that Russia faces in its relations with 
Ukraine. It will offer Russia a stake in Ukraine’s 
GTS and better oversight over the flow of gas to 
Europe. It will protect Russian gas from 
‘unsanctioned’ withdrawal (or alleged ‘theft’) and 
give Russia a mechanism with which to redress the 
problems if Ukraine breaks its commitments. The 
EU’s participation will avert the need for Gazprom 
to alert or request the help of the EU when it faces 
problems with Ukraine (as is currently the case).
25 
Second, Russia could afford to hold back its very 
costly diversification projects, such as Nord Stream 
and South Stream until better times, and in the 
meantime work could go ahead without delay on the 
maintenance and expansion of the existing capacities 
in Ukraine. Finally, Russia will start an energy 
cooperation project both with the EU and Ukraine 
that might take a lot of conflict potential out of their 
relations. 
Costs. First, Gazprom would not exercise control 
over the entire GTS and would have to share it with 
an EU counterpart. This could be perceived as a 
failure by Gazprom, which managed to acquire 
                                                      
25 “Gazprom issues warning on Ukraine pipes”, Financial 
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substantial stakes in energy companies all over 
Europe (including in some Russia-sceptical states 
and CIS states).
26 But even in the years of maximum 
rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia during 
Kuchma’s second presidential term, Gazprom did 
not manage to come any closer to its objective. 
Instead, it had to limit its presence in Ukraine’s 
market to some palliatives, such as intermediary gas 
traders (Rosukrenrgo or EuralTransGas earlier), half 
of which belonged to Gazprom with the other half 
belonging to Ukrainian shareholders.  
Second, the EU might want as a condition to see the 
ECT and its draft Transit Protocol agreed and ratified 
by Russia. In line with its past behaviour Russia 
would be strongly opposed to this. The possible 
solution might be a half-way agreement. The 
consortium would be bound by the rules of the ECT 
and its transit provisions, as they have been ratified 
by Ukraine. Their provisions would be applicable 
only to the consortium and Ukraine’s GTS, while 
they would remain void on Russian territory due to 
Russia’s non-ratification. This could be presented as 
a viable argument for those in Russia, who would see 
the ratification of the ECT as a concession to Europe 
and oppose it. 
The European Union 
Benefits. First, it would assure the non-problematic 
transit of current or increasing volumes of gas to 
Europe. Moreover, the EU could further bind 
Ukraine and Russia to European standards of 
transparency as regards the management of gas 
transit through Ukraine. The consortium would also 
amount to a middle-ground position, which could 
find consensus between those EU member states that 
give priority to cooperation with Russia (like 
Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and Greece) and those that 
are looking for more engagement with Ukraine 
(Poland, the Baltic states, Sweden and the UK). 
Thus, the consortium would have a better chance of 
winning consensus within the EU than current 
projects such as Nabucco, Nord Stream or South 
Stream.  
Costs. With regard to the ECT and Transit Protocol, 
the EU would have to accept the limit of their 
application to the consortium in Ukraine, leaving 
further negotiations with Russia on these agreements 
to a later stage. Given that it is unrealistic to expect 
that Russia will ratify the ECT in the foreseeable 
future, any half-step in that direction is better for the 
EU than the status quo.  
The EU will continue to rely heavily on gas 
deliveries from Russia through Ukraine. This could 
                                                      
26 See Appendix 4 for a listing of Gazprom’s participation 
in other energy companies throughout Europe. 
possibly meet with opposition from those who look 
for diversification away from these countries. 
Although this point of view has a political and 
economic rationale, the EU cannot in the short or 
medium term avoid its great reliance on both 
Ukraine and Russia. Proposed diversification 
projects could only cover part of Europe’s needs for 
gas and would not be able to substitute for Russia 
and Ukraine as the EU’s main energy partners. 
Hence, the establishment of the consortium would 
only provide a guarantee that Russian gas – in 
sufficient volumes – would be safely delivered to the 
borders of the EU.  
6. Conclusions 
The January 2009 interruptions of gas supplies from 
Russia to the EU via Ukraine, following the earlier 
2006 crisis, has confirmed the absolutely intolerable 
situation in which a commodity of strategic 
importance for European industry and households 
has become uncertain and erratic, in breach of long-
term supply contracts, as a result of disorderly 
commercial and political relations between Russia 
and Ukraine. 
The recently agreed tri-partite (EU, Russia, Ukraine) 
monitoring system is a positive step, even if at the 
time of writing (19 January) supplies have not yet 
resumed. But in any case this can be viewed as no 
more than a stop-gap measure. A more fundamental 
and permanent solution is required. For this purpose 
we propose that the EU, Russia and Ukraine 
negotiate the creation of a new business consortium 
to be granted a long-term concession to operate the 
Ukraine trunk gas transit pipeline. The consortium 
agreement should be supported by a treaty to be 
signed and ratified by the EU, and Russian and 
Ukrainian governments, thus providing legal, 
economic and political guarantees for the new 
venture at the highest level.  
The consortium proposition does not offer an 
overarching solution to the problem of security of 
energy supplies for the EU. However it could serve 
the needs of all the parties involved, mending the 
existing cracks in EU-Ukraine-Russia cooperation. 
Whether they like it or not, all three parties are 
highly dependent on each other. Thus, they need to 
exploit every opportunity to re-launch their energy 
cooperation. 
Nor would the project be a substitute for 
diversification projects in the EU and Russia. 
Strategic thinking dictates that a country should not 
allow itself to rely on one supplier or consumer, 
especially for strategic energy supplies. The rationale 
for diversification is admitted by all parties. But a 
successful EU-Ukraine-Russia consortium would 
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and allow each others’ diversification plans to be 
viewed with less reserve and more understanding.  
More transparency and cooperation – not 
disengagement – should be the answer to the existing 
EU-Ukraine-Russia energy challenges. The gas 
transit consortium – aimed at decreasing mutual 
insecurities – might improve not only the energy 
situation but also serve as a model of international 
corporate governance, and even help improve the 
geopolitical climate in Europe. At a time when 
bilateral relations between both the EU and Russia 
and between Russia and Ukraine are badly in need of 
substantial improvement, and when the parties’  
numerous political declarations ring so hollow, a 
concrete project with these qualities might be worth 
even more than a huge quantity of safely delivered 
gas. The EU should push for such a solution, 
indicating moreover that it would be treated as a 
necessary complement to the proposed new 
Association Agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine, and to the proposed new Agreement 
between the EU and Russia. An outright condition of 
concluding these new agreements would be the 
resolution of this appallingly disorderly gas transit 
affair.   
 
 
Appendix 1. 
Terms of reference for the monitoring of the transit of natural gas through Ukraine 
With a view to facilitating the transit of natural gas 
supplied by Gazprom to its customers in the European 
Union, the European Commission, the Government of 
Russia and the Government of Ukraine agree to establish, 
with immediate effect, a monitoring mechanism to 
immediately start to observe the transit of gas through 
Ukraine. 
The function of monitoring mechanism shall be conducted 
by the International Commission with the following 
composition: European Commission and its experts, 
Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, Ministry of 
Fuel and Energy of Ukraine, JSC Gazprom, NJSC 
Naftogaz Ukrainy and the European companies, 
consumers of the Russian natural gas, including: GdF 
Suez S.A (France), E.ON Ruhrgas AG, WINGAS GmbH 
(Germany), RWE Transgas a.s. (Czech Republic), SPP 
a.s. (Slovakia), EconGas GmbH (Austria), ENI SpA 
(Italy), FGSZ Ltd. (Hungary), EAO Sofiagaz (Bulgaria), 
Public Gas Corporation of Greece (Greece), JSC 
Moldovagas (Moldova), and also Statoil Hydro (Norway) 
and Societé Générale de Surveillance. 
The European Commission, the Government of the 
Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine, 
together with their relevant companies, shall designate 
their expert monitors, no more than 25 each and shall 
inform each other of their designations. 
The monitors shall collect data on the flow of gas at the 
below mentioned locations in Ukraine and Russia and the 
members states of the European Union, shall make this 
data available for official purposes to the European 
Commission, to the Government of Ukraine and to the 
Government of the Russian Federation. 
The parties guarantee complete and unrestricted access of 
monitors to all relevant institutions, including: 
•  on the territory of Ukraine: the underground storages 
of gas and the following metering stations: Orlovka, 
Tekovo, Beregovo, Uzhgorod, Drozdovichi; 
•  on the territory of the Russian Federation the 
following metering stations: Sokhranovka, Sudja, 
Pisarevka, Valujki, Platovo; 
•  on the territory of the EU countries bordering Ukraine 
and to the information needed to ascertain the flow of 
gas from Russia through Ukraine to the countries of 
European Union, for as long as needed. A certified 
copy of these Terms of Reference shall be sufficient 
proof for granting access. 
Information gathered by the monitors, received at the 
metering stations, shall be transmitted in real time to 
competent bodies in Brussels, Moscow and Kiev. 
The Ukrainian and Russian authorities shall facilitate, and 
in no way hinder, the work of the monitors throughout 
their stay in Ukraine and the Russian Federation and on 
the territory of the European Union member states. 
All financial expenditures connected with the activities of 
the monitors shall be covered by the sending sides. 
The Parties agreed to establish a Protocol setting out the 
more detailed terms of reference for an "International 
Expert Commission" on transit of natural gas through the 
territory of Ukraine as soon as possible. These agreed 
Terms of Reference shall at least cover: 
•  control of performance of transit obligations for 
natural gas through the territory of Ukraine; 
•  monitoring of the technical state of the gas transport 
system, including underground gas storage located in 
Ukraine, where relevant to the transit of gas to the 
European Union; and 
•  other issues, such as the elaboration of 
recommendations and proposals on optimization of 
transit of natural gas through the territory of Ukraine, 
•  monitoring on gas metering stations on the territory of 
Russia, located at the entry points to the GTS of 
Ukraine and control of the metering stations on the 
territory of European Union member states bordering 
Ukraine. 
Source: http://www.gazprom.ru/news/2009/01/ 
121800_33574.shtml 
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Appendix 2. Working meeting between President Dmitri Medvedev and Deputy Prime 
Minister Igor Sechin, 16 January 2009, Gorky, Moscow Region 
Excerpts from the discussion 
Dmitry Medvedev: Igor Ivanovich, let's talk about the 
gas issue. How are we doing on supplying European 
consumers with Russian gas? 
Igor Sechin: Dmitry Anatolyevich, Gazprom keeps trying 
to get this gas moving and has confirmed the volumes 
required by Western consumers, especially the most 
affected countries, those in the Balkans and Slovakia. But 
this gas is still not being pumped by the Ukrainian side. 
Moreover, according to information we received today 
from Kiev, efforts to implement your proposal on gas 
swap operations aimed at maintaining the priority needs of 
Moldova and Slovakia have also not been successful. 
President of Slovakia Ivan Gaљparoviи has gone to Kiev 
and tried to persuade the Ukrainian side to take part in the 
gas swap, as has the Prime Minister of Moldova, Zinaida 
Greceanii. But our Ukrainian colleagues maintain that 
such operations are impossible, despite the information 
sent to Gazprom by Deputy Chairman of Naftogaz of 
Ukraine concerning the feasibility of conducting such 
operations. 
Dmitry Medevedv: That is inexplicable. 
I spoke yesterday with the President of Ukraine and 
reiterated the urgency of getting gas to the countries that 
have suffered the most from the closing of Ukraine's gas 
pipes - Slovakia, Bulgaria and Moldova. I pointed out that 
these gas exchange operations, the so-called swaps, could 
be implemented so that Ukraine could send them its gas 
and our gas would arrive in Ukraine. 
And in a conversation with the President of Ukraine, he 
told me that they would look into this issue. The fact that 
they have refused confirms an indisputable fact that they 
are thinking primarily about their own interests, about 
satisfying their own consumers, and not giving any 
thought to transit or other functions. 
 
Another issue that I raised during my conversation with 
the President of Ukraine was the creation of a consortium 
of European companies with temporary rights to the gas 
that must be put into Ukraine's pipelines so that its gas 
transmission system can get back to its normal pressure, 
something which would in turn enable Ukraine to begin 
normal gas transportation. I suggested this to the 
Ukrainian President but he did not give me an answer. 
Igor Sechin: Your proposal has been supported by the 
largest European producers and consumers of gas. As you 
know, yesterday the Prime Minister of Russia met with 
the head of the Italian company ENI. Today in Berlin 
discussions with the heads of these companies are 
continuing and we have been informed that E.ON 
Ruhrgas, Gaz de France, ENI, WINGAS and supposedly 
OMV, an Austrian company, are interested in 
participating in the consortium. 
Dmitry Medvedev: Good. 
…..We need to perform our duties properly just as the 
contract stipulates – to sign these contracts in a timely 
fashion and pay for them on time. 
If this does not happen we must think about a new 
mechanism to protect our interests and those of European 
consumers. In this connection, of course we need to think 
about and pay attention to the possibility of increasing the 
capacity of both North Stream and South Stream because 
we cannot be so dependent on a transit state, with all due 
respect to the people who work there.  
Source: www.kremlin.ru  
 
 
 
Appendix 3. 
Press conference of Prime Ministers Putin and Timoshenko, Moscow, 17 January 2009 
Extracts 
Vladimir Putin said: “In the very near future, transit – 
and the Ukrainian side has assured us to this effect – will 
resume.”    
Yulia Tymoshenko said that the two countries’ energy 
companies, Gazprom and Naftohaz, had been instructed to 
draw up the relevant contracts by Monday.  
“Immediately after all the documents on the transit and 
purchase of gas are signed, all the routes for gas transit 
and gas supplies to Europe will be restored,” she said.  
Vladimir Putin said: “We agreed that in 2009 our 
Ukrainian partners will have a discount of 20% on 
condition that the preferential tariff for piping Russian gas 
to European consumers through Ukraine in 2009 remains 
in force and that the price for piping will be the price of 
2008”.  
“We also agreed that from 1 January 2010 we will entirely 
move to price and tariff formation fully in accordance 
with European standards without any exemptions or 
discounts as regards both the transit and the price of gas.”  
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7834796.stm 
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Appendix 4. Selected Gazprom investments in the CIS and EU states 
Company State  Gazprom’s  share  Other shareholders  Disputes  Sector 
Moldovagaz  Moldova  50% or over  35.3% Moldovan 
government; 13.44% 
Transnistria; and 
private shareholders 
Occasional setbacks in the relations between Gazprom and Moldovan 
government, mostly relating to the gas price and Transnistria’s gas debt; 
however, they have never spilled over into a major political crisis. 
Gas trade 
Beltransgaz Belarus  25% 
(50% by 2011) 
50% Belarusian 
government 
2006 – Russia announced that it would raise the gas price for Belarus; 
after Belarus refused to negotiate a higher price, Gazprom suspended its 
gas supplies; in May 2007 an agreement was reached that Gazprom 
would receive a 50% share in Beltransgaz by 2011 in exchange for 
gradual raising of the price on Russian gas over the next four years. 
Gas trade and 
transmission 
ArmRosGazprom Armenia  75.55%  20%  Armenian 
government, 4.44% 
Itera 
No major disputes  Gas trade 
Lietuvos Dujos  Lithuania  37.1%  35% E.ON Ruhrgas, 
34% Lithuanian 
government 
No major disputes  Gas trade 
Latvijas Gaze  Latvia  34% 16%  Russia’s  Itera, 
47.5% E.ON Ruhrgas 
No major disputes  Gas trade and 
transmission 
Europol Gaz  Poland  48%  48% PNGiG, 4% - Gas 
Trading 
Jan 2007 – Russia demanded lower transit fees for Russian gas shipped 
through the Polish part of Yamal-Europe and a higher say in decision-
making; Poland refused to do so on the basis of the originally established 
agreement of 1993; the parties went to a court and later solved the issue 
through negotiations. 
Gas transmission 
SPP Slovakia  16.3%  51%  Slovak 
government, 16.3% 
E.ON Ruhrgas and 
16.3% Gaz de France 
Sep 2008 – Ruhrgas and Gaz de France required Slovakia to raise its 
domestic gas prices by 20%. This was opposed by the Slovak Prime 
Minister Robert Fico, who threatened to nationalise the shares of the two 
Western gas companies. No disruptions followed. In 2008 Gazprom 
signed a contract to supply gas to the SPP until 2028. 
Gas transmission 
Panrusgas  Hungary  40%  50% E.ON Ruhrgas, 
10% Centrex Hungaria 
No major disputes  Gas trade and 
transmission 
Overgas Inc.  Bulgaria  50%  50% Overgas Holding  No major disputes  Gas trade and 
construction of 
pipelines 
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